




A Progressive Agenda for 
the Twenty-First Century 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 1 
My intent in writing this chapter is to lay out what I see as a Progressive economic 
agenda for the twenty-first century. By its very definition, the Progressive agenda 
has to change, it has to progress-as our understandings of the economy and society 
change, and as technology, the economy, and society themselves change. 
But before setting forth a Progressive agenda for the twenty-first century, I would 
like to explore the key beliefs and values of the Progressive movement What is it 
that a Progressive economy should be striving for? Both the left and the right repeat-
edly pay homage to values, but too often, those values are either left unspecified, 
or are defined in ways that are so banal as to be uncontroversial: the value of the 
individual, the value of freedom, the value of the family. 
As I see it, Progressives stand for a core set of values, which are far from 
banalities-values that many on the right would not subscribe to.2 Too often, the 
progressive movement is implicitly defined by the conservatives and by what it 
opposes. Here, I want to deliniate the positive progressive agenda. 
First on the agenda is the value of progress itsel£ Society can and should change 
to help us better achieve what we strive for. Thus the Progressive movement puts a 
high value on innovation-both technological innovation and social innovation. i I 
But in emphasizing change, Progressives do not ignore the legacy of the past, which 
is to say they value the ideas and understandings inherited from previous genera-
tions. This represents a fundamental difference between Progressives and conserva-
tives, whose focus is on preserving the past and the attendant inequities and power 
structures that have often prevailed in earlier years. 
The Progressive agenda is today's embodiment of the Enlightenment project: the 
belief that through rational and scientific enquiry we can learn, and what we learn 
can be used to improve well-being. Overall, the Enlightenment project has been 
enormously successful: for thousands of years, standards of living improved at a rate 
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that was barely perceptible. Most individuals spent all of their energies siruply to 
survive and to acquire the bare necessities oflife such as food, clothing, and shelter. 
Today; because of the Enlightenment and the advances in science and technology 
that followed, those needs require but a few hours of work a week; the rest of our 
time can be devoted to the acquisition of goods beyond the bare necessities and to 
leisure activities, including the development of culture and science, the expanding 
of our horizons, and the raising of our living standards still further.3 
We have come to understand too that there may be, at any point in time, lim-
its to what we know or what can be known. Godel's theorem and the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle represent the most forceful articulation of these limits to our 
knowledge. Progressives do not seek certainty where there is none; we have to live 
with uncertainty and ambiguity.4 
This rational enquiry extends not only to the physical sciences but also to the 
social sciences, as well as to our understanding of man, bis behavior, and his rela-
tionship with others. 
Any research agenda attempting to iruprove the plight of the world's population 
must begin with an enquiry into the nature of man-what he cares about, what 
motivates him, how he thinks, and how he behaves. Modem economics is based 
on a certain conception of the individual. Individuals come into the world with 
well-formed preferences and beliefs. They are rational. But a rational enquiry into 
human behavior shows that these beliefs are not always well founded. Individuals' 
beliefs and preferences are at least partially culturally determined, and there are 
many ways and instances in which behavior is far from rational.5 This helps explain 
why certain subcultures-those belonging to a particular political party. in particu-
lar locations, for example-embrace beliefs that seem so at odds with scientific evi-
dence, such as the belief that climate change is a myth.6 
The notion that individuals and their beliefs are malleable should fill us with 
hope: for it means that in principle, we might create a society in which more indi-
viduals conform to our ideals. We could create a society in which there is more trust, 
more charifyj more cooperation, as well as less selfishness, less greed, and less cor-
ruption. We might create a society with less racism and prejudice. 
But in another way; the changing nature of beliefs leaves us without an anchor. 
Standard welfare economics, for example, had a well-defined objective-increasing 
the well-being of individuals with well-formed preferences that specify the degree 
of happiness, satisfaction, or utility provided by any bundle of goods and activities. 
But if preferences themselves are malleable, what is it that we are supposed to maxi-
mize? By assuming preformed preferences and beliefs, economists had, however, 
taken the easy way out of some of the deepest and most iruportant philosophical 
questions: What is a good society? What is a good individual? 
Sketching what might be answers to these questions would take me beyond 
this short essay. But progressives share certain views on these matters. Individuals 
should, for instance, take into account how their actions affect others (or at least 
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weigh the externalities' that they impose). Progressives also affirm the value oflib-
erty, the right of others to do as they please, so long as their actions do not impose 
costs on others. 
These views are also partially derived from rational analysis: we all live in a soci-
ety that not only affects our preferences but also affects us in myriad other ways. 
Indeed, no individual is "self-created," although listening to commentary from the 
right (even from those who inherited their fortunes from their parents) one might 
have thought otherwise.' As Newton said, even the giants who have made the most 
profound contributions to our society stand on the shoulders of those who went 
before.' The individual and the collective are inextricably intertwined. And if that is 
so, we have to think hard not just about how what we do affects ourselves but also 
how it affects others. 
There are many areas where the impacts on others can be quite signllicant. If 
I drive too fast, pollute the atmosphere or water, I can impose enormous costs on 
others, even death. My freedom is your unfreedom. No discussion of liberty can 
ignore this basic insight. Creating a good society entails imposing restrictions on 
what one individual does~ when those actions might affect others. 
There .are some cases where, to use the ec~nomist's jargon, regulations, stan-
dards1 restrictions can be Pareto improvemeilts10: that is, everyone would be bet-
ter off living with certain restrictions than with the absence of those restrictions. 
Without stoplights, no one could drive across Manhattan without fear of an acci-
dent or being caught in gridlock. Traffic regulations enhance the safety and speed 
for (almost) everyone. But often, some regulations provide more benefits to some 
at the expense of others. 
The right has worked hard to give regulations a bad name. At the same time, they 
talk about the importance of the rule oflaw. But the law is nothing more than the 
basic rules and regulations that govern society. And it matters what rules and regula-
tions are in place and whether they serve a few at the top or everyone in society. It. 
matters too how they are enforced and implemented. 
On the other hand, what individuals do privately-among consenting 
adults-should not be restricted. To be sure, someone else's well-being might be 
affected by the knowledge that something that he disapproves of is occurring. One 
could argue that there is, as a result, an externality, but Progressives believe that this 
is a category of externalities that shouldn't be regulated. 
This is an arena in which progressives and the right couldn't be more different. 
Many on the right oppose gun control, arguing that it impillges on the freedom to 
carry guns. But there is a huge societal cost to that freedom: that cost being in the 
death of thousands of innocent victims. In balancing the right to live and the right 
to carry a machine gun) most progressives are solidly for the former. 
The opposite is true when it comes to the issue of gay marriage and the extension 
of!egal rights to same-sex couples. Here, Progressives argue that society is. attempt-
ing to restrict actions that affect no one but the two consenting adults, and therefore 
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there are no grounds for such restrictions. The right, often appealing to basic laws of 
nature, argues otherwise. 
More generally, the right often makes appeals to long-standing institutions like 
marriage, as if they were God given and that history gives them sanctity. Progressives 
see institutions as something we create to serve our purposes, and as we come to 
understand better the purposes they serve, and the way they succeed or fail to fulfill 
those purposes (or how they might serve other ends), institutions get reformed, or 
even destroyed and replaced. Intellectual property law, for instance, is not part of 
natural law but is a human construct, designed to promote innovation. We need to 
understand the ways in which the latter accomplishes this and how it may actually 
impede innovation. So too for each of the institutions in our society. 
This is not to say that progressives give short shrift to history. As I have said, insti-
tutions exist to serve certain needs. The fact that an institution has survived may 
indicate that it has served those needs well. But society and the economy change, 
and what served some needs well at one time may not serve them well at another. 
More importantlri the power structures-whose views are most reflected in exist-
ing arrangements-may change. An institutional arrangement that served yester-
day's elites well may not be appropriate in a more democratic era. 
Moreover, progressives recognize that one cannot create new institutions out 
of whole cloth. That is why evolutionary processes are often more successful than 
revolutionary processes. This is also why some ofus were skeptical about the "shock 
therapy" approach to the transition from Communism to the market economy and 
preferred a more gradualist approach, where new democratic institutions and legal 
frameworks could be established as a market economy was being created. A market 
economy without an appropriate rule oflaw, we feared, would be a jungle. And so 
it turned out to be.11 
Earlier in this paper, we explained how the actions of one individual affect others. 
We are interdependent. This makes it almost inevitable that society engages in col-
lective action. By providing goods collectively, 12 and by providing rules and regula-
tions, we all have a chance to be better off. But once one admits of the desirability 
of some collective action, one has to have some mechanism for collective decision 
making with rules and regulations that govern that process, including those that limit 
what can and cannot be subject to collective decision making. Here, too, progres-
sives tend to share a firm belief in democratic, participatory processes. At the same 
time, they believe certain restraints on government are necessary. These views are 
reflected in the Bill of Rights guaranteeing freedoms of speech and religion. Today; 
we recognize other rights such as the right to privacy and the right to know (e.g., 
what the government is doing). But we also recognize that there are certain societal 
obligations, reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-including the 
right to health care and to certain other basic needs. 
While both progressives and the right pay obeisance to democratic principles, 
there is often a difference in what is meant. Democracy means more than an 
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election every four years. Modem Progressives pnt considerable weight on inclu-
sive and participatory processes, aware that in the past certain views, and the views 
of certain groups, were not heard (or at least were not heard loudly) while other 
viewsJ and the views of certain other groups) tended to dominate. 13 To be sureJ pro-
gressives would like some views to be heard more loudly than others: for example, 
those views derived from evidence and sound reasoning. And they are wary of the 
power of money. 
'This is another arena where the progressives and the right couldn't disagree 
more. In the United States, the right has been actively engaged in a campaign of 
disenfranchisement of the poor, for which there is a long historical precedent. 14 At 
the same time, decisions like Citizens United and restrictions on campaign finance 
reform have enhanced the power of money to affect electoral outcomes. As I sug-
gested in my book 1he Price of Inequality 15, America has become a country closer to 
"one dollar one vote" than to "one person one vote." A key challenge for the country 
is how to prevent America's outsized economic inequality from being.further trans-
lated into political inequality. An active agenda of gerrymandering by the right has 
further reduced democratic representativeness and accountability. 
The challenge of creating more effective) inclusive) participatoryprocesses is one 
of the key issues facing the progressive movement. But while we may not know how 
to create an ideal system, we can identify changes that make the system worse. These 
are key battlegrounds for progressives today. 
By the same token, we know how to increase accountability: • rightto know" laws 
are essential.16 But also essential is media diversity, to ensure that there is a free and 
fair marketplace of ideas. 'This will not be the case if media outlets are dominated 
only by the rich and powerful. 
Antitrust laws were originally enacted more to prevent the concentration of polit-
ical power than to ensure market efficiency. But in the more than one hundred years 
since these were first enacted during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, we 
have narrowed our vision: we have forgotten the dangers that the concentration of 
economic power pose to our democratic political process-and nowhere .is this 
more important than in the media. Equally significant, especially in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, is the power of the big banks to stymie the wishes of most 
.Americans to enact more effective regulations in the :financial sector.17 
I would also argne that there is one respect in which the Enlightenment project 
has failed: we must acknowledge that a significant portion of today's population, 
while benefiting from the advances of science, do not subscribe to its core tenets 
and deny one aspect of the findings of modern science or another. Many people do 
not believe in evolution, and many still do not believe in climate change.18 But the 
analytic approach that underlies Progressivism has never come to terms with these 
seeming anomalies. As I noted earlier, one element of "rational enquiry" involves 
recognition of the limits of rationality. To make matters worse, it may be in the inter-
ests of some groups in society to encourage this kind of irrationality: oil companies 
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stand to gain economically if more people believe that climate change is a hoax, and 
they are willing to use their money to persuade others that this is true. (In other 
contexts, the elites deliberately left large masses of the population undereducated.) 
I have emphasized that the Progressive agenda is about change, but that raises 
questions: Change for what ends? What is it that we should be striving for? How do 
we know whether the change is making things better or worse? These are, ofcourse, 
extremely complicated questions, encompassing all of the issues we have been dis-
cussing. But there is a short answer: change should enrich the lives of all citizens, to 
enable them to flourish and to live up to their potential. 
In putting the matter this way, I emphasize one aspect of the Progressive 
agenda-that of social justice. Social justice and fairness have, of course, many 
dimensions-not just at a moment in time, but over generations. Part of social 
justice-and a key way in which its attainment is more likely to be assured-is 
ensuring equality of voice, especially in our political process. Part of social justice is 
equal access to justice-enshrined in the pledge of allegiance to the flag that school 
children recite every day. Justice is for all, not just for those who can afford it. There 
is the matter of justice acro'ss generations (what economiSts refer to as "intergenera-
tional" justice). Despoiling the environment today puts those in future generations 
at risk. 
Progressives believe that all individuals, regardless of their parentage, should 
have the right to live up to their potential and that there should equal opportunity 
for all. They also believe that excessive inequality is morally wrong; that it alters 
and effectively undermines the functioning- of our society, our economy, and our 
democracy.19 
There are some inequities that are so egregious that they call for special 
attention-for instance, inequalities in access to health care. Given all of this, the 
attainment of certain minimal standards (commensurate with a country's economic 
capacity), have come to be recognized as basic economic and social rights within 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Earlier I referred to the progressive commitment to equal access to justice. 1his 
is part of a broader commitment to the rule oflaw. But what progressives and con-
servatives mean by the rule oflaw can be markedly different. It is not any rule of!aw. 
After all, the feudal order was, in a sense, a rule of law, with well-defined obligationsi 
constraints, and norms. In effect, it enshrined the principle that might makes right. 
It was a rule oflaw that served those at the top and acted to preserve a hierarchy. 
What Progressives mean by a rule oflaw is intricately related to precepts of social 
justice: a rule oflaw designed to protect the weak, not to preserve the entitlements 
of the strong; a rule oflaw whiCh, both de jure and de facto, enshrines the principle 
of equality of all before the law. 
In this brief discussion, I have had to elide several key issues. What do we mean 
by fairness? Many on the right believe that it is unfair to tax the rich whose wealth 
is their just desserts for what they have contributed to society. Progressives believe 
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that no one is really self-made a.Ild that all of us are dependent on what we receive 
from others and from society more generally: Progressives also believe that there is 
more than a little bit ofluck in determining certain personal economic outcomes. 
What do we mean by excessive inequality? While that is an important question, 
for current policy discussions, we don't have to answer it: the level of inequality 
experienced in the United States and other countries is well beyond the level that 
should be viewed as acceptable. (Note that progressives do not call for complete 
equality. Even if that were attainable, there is a recognition that some inequality may 
be desirable to provide the incentives that are required in order for our economy to 
function.) 
What does it mean to live up to one's potential? Although again I cannot give a 
full treatment here, let me say what it is not. It is not just maximizing one's income. 
Humans are more than goods-producing machines, which if fine tuned can do a 
better job in transforming inputs into outputs. Living up to one's potential means 
full use ofone's mental and physical capabilities. It recognizes that we as individuals 
gain pleasure from using our minds and that when those talents are turned to prob-
lems of societal importance, society as a whole benefits. It recognizes too that we 
are social beings, and that, as such, social connections are important. Progressivism 
goes beyond materialism: man cannot live without bread, but man cannot live on 
bread alone. 
Because this is so, progressives eschew GDP fetishism: the objective of our soci-
ety is not to maximize GDP. As Robert Kennedy famously said, GDP "measures 
everything, in short, e:ii:cept that which makes life worthwhile."20 O~ to quote FDR'.s 
first inaugural speech, "Happiness lies not in the mere possession of money; it lies 
in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort. The joy, the moral stimula-
tion of work no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits:'21 
THE PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC AGENDA 
Let us now tum our attention to the more narrow set of traditional economic 
issues: What should be or· is the Progressive view of the role of the state in the 
economy? What should be the Progressive economic agenda? One cannot answer 
these questions without reference to the underlying foundations presented in the 
first part of this chapter: the nature of human choices, the relationship between the 
individual and society, our values and what we are striving for. 
Given the high ground that the right has assumed in recent decades, perhaps it is 
best to begin with an explanation of the counter position and what is wrong with it. 
The right's economic worldview is predicated on the notion that markets, on their 
own, are efficient and stable and thus there iS no need for government; and even 
if there were some minor problems, collective action (government) would at best 
be ineffective, and it would more likely make matters worse. It goes further: even 
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when there is only one firm in a particular market, ever-present potential competi-
tion fully disciplines the monopolist; and even when there are externalities, Coasian 
bargaining can (given an assigmnent of secure property rights) lead to an efficient 
outcome.22 There is no need for government intervention, say those· on the right, 
although in some instances there is a need for voluntary collective action: for exam-
ple, non-smokers might have to bribe smokers not to smoke, and so on.23 
These views seemed to draw upon a long intellectual tradition dating back to 
Adam Smith, who explained how the pursuit of self-interest would lead, as if by an 
invisible hand, to the well-being of society. But Adam Smith was far more nuanced 
in his reasoning than his latter-day followers. He understood the proclivity of mar-
kets toward monopolization. He understood the role of government, for instance, in 
providing for education. Adam Smith was, in effect, describing one of the attributes 
of the market economy, one of the forces at play~countervailed by other forces 
going in other directions. · 
It would be nearly 1 7 S years later before economists were able to show the 
sense in which competitive markets might lead to the well-being of society. Tills 
well-being is expressed as "Pareto efficien~y," in which no one can be made better 
off without making someone worse off-a construct that pays no attention at all 
to distributive justice.24 As research progressed, it became clear that contrary to 
the presumption of Smithians, the market was almost never efficient: the intel-
lectual underpinnings of these doctrines (that I have referred elsewhere to as 
market fundamentalism) have been totally destroyed in the past thirty years. For 
instance, with imperfect and asymmetric information or with limited risk mar-
kets, markets are never Pareto efficient, even taking into account the costs of gath-
ering information Qr creating markets.25 Agency costs and externalities are rife. 
Markets on their own are not only inefficient, they may not be stable-witness 
the crises that have afflicted the global economy since the beginning of the era 
of deregulation. 
Even a casual inspection of modemAmerican capitalism has shown that this opti-
mistic attitude regarding markets without government intervention has not worked 
well: cigarette companies were killing .our citizens; chemical companies were pol-
luting our rivers; energy cOmpanies are polluting our air; the financial sector neither 
allocated capital well nor managed risk-and polluted the global economy with 
toxic mortgages; monopoly power is a reality in large segments of the. economy; 
and corporations often seem more interested in maximizing the well-being of their 
executives than in enhancing stock market value, let alone the well-being of society 
more generally. 
It should also be clear that the market does not work in the way depicted by eco-
nomic textbooks, where demand always equals supply. We have homeless people 
and empty homes. We have vast needs-investments required to retrofit the global 
economy to address the reality of global warruing, and investment needs in infra-
structure, technology, and education not only in developing countries but even in 
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advanced countries-and yet we have vastlyunderutilizedresources, large numbers 
of unemployed workers, andidle industrial plants and equipment. Some may claim 
there is a ·savings glut''; in truth, we have financial markets that seem unable to rede-
ploy the world's scarce savings to where social returns are highest. 
The progressive movement grew naturally from observing these repeated 
instances in which markets-in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century ver-
sion of capitalism-seemed to be failing to serve the interests of society more 
broadly. Through the advances in economics over the past half-century, we have 
come to understand better these pervasive "market failures," and so we now know 
how to make markets better serve society. 
This then is one of the responsibilities of government: to make markets act like 
markets27, to act more like the textbook models in which what they do does serve 
societal interests. This entails passing and enforcing good laws on corporate gov-
ernance, competition, bankruptcy, the environment, conflicts of interest, etc., 
and strong regulations that restrict the ability of anyone to impose large costs 
on others. 
It is, perhaps, ironic that it has been left to Progressives, often seen as critics of 
markets, to make markets act like markets. It is not clear what the real problem of 
the right is: Do they really think that the pervasive market imperfections that have 
been noted do not exist? Or is it that corporate money sees that by rigging the rules 
in their favor, they can enhance their own short-sighted interests? 
We should also recognize that markets don't exist in a vacuum They function 
under a set of rules and regulations, and how they function depends on those rules 
and regulations. If those rules and regulations allow for greater scope for conflicts of 
interest, then there will be more «perverse" and ineffici~nt behavior. There will be 
less trust-a subject to which I will return shortly. 
Every rule (and more broadly every policy, every tax, every expenditure) affects 
not just the efficiency of the market but also the distribution. (This too was one of 
the main messages of The Price of Inequality.) When a bankruptcy law gives first 
priority to derivatives, it distorts the economy and enriches the bankers buying and 
selling these weapons of mass financial destruction. 
Earlier, I described social justice as a basic Progressive value. But the Progressive 
equality agenda can be defended on more than just moral grounds: we pay a high 
price for our high level of inequality; we could have more growth and stability, 
greater efficiency, and higher standards ofliving and increased well-being. 
This is a marked departure from how the right looks at matters. They see a 
trade-off between efficiency and equity, and they often argue that any attempt to 
achieve greater equality would be counterproductive-that it is those at the bottom 
who would most suffer. They seem to assert (-without proving it) that we are in a 
Rawlsian equilibrium. 28 
Today, the vocabulary has shifted. Since as the rich have gotten richer, most of the 
economy has gotten poorer, it's hard to defend trickle-down economicsw Median 
224 THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 
household income adjusted for inflation is lower than it was a quarter century ago.30 
An economy that, over such a long period of time, fails to increase the living stan-
dards of a majority of its citizens is a failed economy. 
Thus, rather than trickle-down economics, we need "trickle-up" economics: if 
those at the bottom and middle do well, so will those at the top. We need, in particu-
lar, to build out from the middle. 
The argument of the right today is implicitly based on a counterfactual 
claim: were it not for all the money going to the top, the poor would be even 
poorer. For the rich are the job creators. Without them, the poor would not have 
even the meager incomes they have. But this contention flies in the face of both 
evidence and the right's own economic theories. When there is demand for goods, 
entrepreneurs will have an incentive to satisfy that demand. That is the nub of 
Smith's argument. But of course if there is no demand for goods, even the best of 
entrepreneurs will not make investments. Western economies have_demonstrated 
no dearth of entrepreneurship: when demand was high (and even when tax rates 
were very, very high) jobs were created. Whe11 demand is weak, even if tax rates are 
low and firms are sitting on trillions of dollars of cash (so money is no constraint) 
jobs won't be created. 
Even more corrosive for our economy, and for our sense of identity, is the lack 
of opportunity that has come to mark the United States and some other advanced 
countries. Some on the right claim that what matters is not equality of outcomes but 
equality of opportunity. But in saying that, they make two fundamental mistakes. 
The first is the assertion that the United States is in fact a land ofopportunity. To the 
contrary: a young American's life prospects are more dependent on the income and 
education of his parents than iu other advanced countries. And those countries that 
seek to emulate the US economic system are finding that opportunity is diminish-
. ing there as well. 
The second mistake is to presume that one can separate inequality of outcomes 
from inequality of opportunity. Where economic inequality is great, so too is politi- · 
cal inequality; and where inequality of outcomes is great, so too is iuequality of 
opportunity.31 
So far, I have described two of the central roles of government: promoting equal-
ity and social justice, and regulating the economy-establishing the rules of the 
game under which any system has to operate. There is a third role that most even on 
the right accede to: maintaining growth and stability. As the most recent economic 
crisis makes so apparent, markets are not self-regulating. They are prone to booms 
and busts. And when they go iuto recession, they are not quick to recover on their 
own. The government has an important role to play in modulating the excesses of 
markets and, when there is an economic downturn, in helping engineer a recovery. 
But there are two more roles for government that are important parts of the pro-
gressive agenda: promoting growth, entrepreneurship, and development, and pro-
moting social protection. 
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Government (collective action) can play a positive role in promoting growth, 
and-as evidenced by the cbapters in this book-it has done so repeatedly. In fact, 
there are few successful countries in whicb government has not played that role. 32 
Again, we now have a good understanding of why it is that markets are likely to 
underinvest, say, in basic research-and why it is that government made the critical 
investments tbat led to the transformation to modem agriculture and to the cre-
ation of modem telecommunications, from the first telegraph line to the modem 
Intemet.33 
We also have a better understanding of why goverrunent needs to play a central 
role in social protection-why markets have systematically failed in an efficient and 
fair manner to address widely recognized needs for social insurance, whether it be 
for retirement, unemployment, or health care.34 Individuals value security, and yet 
markets do not seem adequately able to address these needs and desires; hence gov-
ernment has stepped in to fill the breach. 35 
We now recognize that different aspects of the economy are intertwined and 
that various sectors of the economy-and the policies that are supposed to gov-
ern them-have an impact on both economic efficiency and social equality. As 
economic policy is formulated, the fundamental progressive agenda laid forth in 
the first part of this chapter need to be borne in mind. Take, for instance, mon-
etary policy, a subject which is usually thought of as tecbnocratic. Conservatives 
have tried to use technocratic arguments as justification for the existence of 
an independent central bank that is largely focused on inflation. But an inde-
pendent central bank, like that in the United States, can easily be captured by 
financial interests. When this occurs-as was the case in the lead-up to the 2008 
financial crisis-little is done to ensure that the financial sector serves the rest 
of the economy and does not simply exploit it. In such a climate, the central 
bank may renege on its responsibility to ensure that the banks do not engage in 
predatory lending, abusive credit card practices, or exploit their market power 
to the detriment of the rest of the economy. In recent history the central bank's 
obsession with inflation led to greater financial instability-and almost surely 
higher levels of unemployment and inequality-than would have occurred if it 
had maintained a more balanced focus on inflation, growth, employment, and 
financial stability.36 
We have also come to understand how inequality leads to macroeconomic insta-
bility and lower economic performance overall. The lower level of social cohesion, 
with the associated lower level of trust, has a direct impact on economic perfor-
mance but an indirect effect as well, because of the lessened support for vital public 
investments in infrastructure, technology, and education. Because of these lower 
investments, larger portions of the population-,especially those at the bottom of 
the economic pyramid-are not able to live up to their potential. Social inequities 
feed on themselves in a downward vicious circle. As a result we waste one of our 
most precious resources: human resources.37 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
I have discussed at length the roles that successful governments can and have played 
in enhancing the well-being of society. 
Some twenty-five years ago, I delivered a lecture in Amsterdam on the economic 
role of the state.38 There, I explained at greater length how modern economic theory 
had shown why markets often fail to prodnce efficient or socially acceptable out-
comes. These have been labeled "market failures;' and I described the roles of the 
government in remedying these failures. The roles that I described roughly accord 
with those just illnstrated. 
I explained how the powers of government enabled it to potentially remedy 
these market failures but then went on to identify certain limitations of government 
(e.g., its limited abilities to make commitments, the fact that it had the power of 
compulsion made constraints on equity and due process more imperative but that 
these constraints were often costly). 
HereJ I want to comment briefly on how recent events and advances in econom-
ics over the past quarter century have modified and enriched our understandings of 
these issues-several of which I have already alluded to. 
We have learned more about the strengths and limitations of government and 
learned more about how we can improve government performance. We have come 
to understand better the risks of capture of government (including cognitive cap-
ture)-the role of money and revolving doors-and how transparency can help. 
The reinventing government initiative during the Clinton administration also 
showed how we can improve both the efficiency and efficacy of government, mak-
ing it mo~e responsive to citizens. Some parts of the.government have demonstrated 
remarkable competencies: for example, the transactions costs associated with 
Social Security are but a fraction of those associated with most private annuities. 
Looking around the world, the public health-care systems in Australia and many 
European countries manage to deliver better health outcomes at a fraction of the 
costs of America's largely private system. Citizens value and respect the teachers 
that teach their children, the firemen that protect their property the policemen 
that ensure law and order. They even like their own Congressmen, overwhelmingly 
tending to reelect them. They tend to make denigrating remarks about other teach-
ers, other Congressmen, and most importantly, about faceless gray bureaucrats. But 
the numbers of these bureaucrats, especially relative to the size of the population or 
the government's budget, has in fact been in marked decline, suggesting that gov-
ernment has become more efficient. 
An understanding of the limitations of government has implications not so much 
for what the government does but how it does it. Even in countries with limited gov-
ernmental capacities, it is still desirable, for instance, for the government to pursue 
industrial policies that promote faster growth, more equality higher employment, 
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and a better environment. But it may be desirable for such governments to utilize 
broader based instrnments, like the management of the exchange rate. 39 
The financial crisis has, of course, made the reality of market failures all the more 
obvious, demonstrating that markets by themselves are neither efficient nor stable. 
It is not just that the market economy is not good at accommodating shocks; the 
market, in fact, amplifies them. It is also that the market economy is prone to create 
its own shocks, with credit cycles and asset bubbles. 
Moreover, the recent crisis has heightened our sense that waste is D.ot the monop-
oly of government: no government has probably resulted in a waste of economic 
resources on the scale of America's financial markets, with the cumulative loss from 
the gap between potential and actual output of the nation's overall economy now 
totaling trillions of dollars. 
We have come to understand the importance of informational and related 
imperfections: agency costs are pervasive, in both the public and private sec-
tor. Deficiencies in corporate governance, no less than in public governance, are 
omnipresent. The economics profession has been slow to take on board Berle and 
Means"' insights about the consequences of the separation of ownership and con-
trol, or Herbert Simon's observation that if there is a difference between public and 
private sector performance, it is not simply a matter of incentives: incentive prob-
lems are universal.41 
By the same token, we have learned that privatization is no panacea. This is 
not just a theoretical observation. The only circumstances in which privatization 
would fully resolve the problems posed by government ownership are the highly 
restricted conditions under which markets are themselves Pareto efficient.42 But 
real phenomena observed time and time again, from British railroads to Mexican 
roads, to American prisons to America's use of mercenary armed forces, shows us 
otherwise.43 
We have seen that the imperfections of inforril.ation are endogenous: banks and 
CEOs have the ability and incentives to distort the information that they reveal, to 
engage in nontransparent transactions. 44 And we have seen how they have fought 
for the right to maintain such lack of transparency, even within government-insured 
institutions. 
We have come . to understand that there are very important related 
macro-externalities. A crisis in one bank can lead to problems in other banks-and 
then to problems in the economy as a whole. 
The most recent crisis has also heightened our uoderstandings of the extent to 
which individuals can be exploited by others, as they were systematically, through 
insider trading, market manipulation (e.g., lib or, foreign exchange), predatory lend-
ing, abusive credit card practices, etc. Most fundamentally, the notion that the econ-
omy can be well described by models based on rational well-informed individuals 
with rational expectations has been totallyuodermined.45 
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But what was perhaps most shocking about the crisis to people on both sides 
of the Atlantic, was the ample evidence of moral turpitude, especially in the finan-
cial sector. It was not that there was a disease that was particularly prevalent in 
the southern part of Manhattan, or that struck with a particular virulence in the 
early days of the twenty-first century, with a relapse a few years later. Rather, it was 
that the economic, political, and social system that had evolved over the preceding 
decades had given rise to an entire class of individuals without moral moorings. 
We had as such created a society in which many Americans found distasteful, all of 
which reinforces the observations I made at the beginning of this chapter: prefer-
ences and behavior are, in part, malleable and culturally determined, and the direc-
tion that the United States had tak.en since the beginning of the Reagan revolution 
was .the wrong direction. 
It is understandable that political disillusionment set in when those that 
had caused the crisis (i.e., the bankers) were bailed out, while innocent 
victims-those who lost their jobs and homes-were left largely to suffer on 
their own. The fact that in the aftermath of the crisis inequality worsened, with 
the top 1 percent getting 95 percent of the gains from 2009 through 201246 has 
led to further disillusionment with our political and economic system. For most 
Americans, the crisis is not over. We can trumpet having prevented another Great 
Depression; h_owever, we cannot claim that we quickly restored America to pros-
perity. Indeed, as noted, the loss resulting from the Great Recession-measured 
by the gap between the trend line, where we would presumably have been had 
the crisis not occurred and the economy's actual output-amounts to trillions 
of dollars. 
The crisis undermined our society's claim not just to fairness, but even to hav-
ing a meaningful rule of law. We had rules governing what should happen when 
banks can't pay back what they owe: a seemingly well designed system of conser-
vatorship. But we rode roughshod over these and basic principles of capitalism 
as we bailed out the bankers, their shareholders and bondholders, and we failed 
to hold accountable those who had caused the crisis. An even more egregious 
violation of the rule oflawwas manifested in the foreclosure crisis, where people 
who did not owe money were thrown out of their homes. A "good" rule oflaw is 
supposed to protect the vulnerable, not the rich and powerful. We did just the 
opposite. 
President Clinton began his Administration with a manifesto called Putting 
People First. If one does put people first, it means a focus on the things they care 
about: jobs and wages, education, health and home, opportunity and security. 
The progressive economic agenda must concentrate on these. We know what to 
do to make significant progress on each of these fronts. We know what to do to 
increase equality and opportunity. The problem is the politics. And that is why 
a progressive economic agenda cannot be separated from a progressive political 
agenda. 
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